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The Right of Recovery for
Prenatal Injuries
A. A. White*
Many years ago, arguments raged on the question of whether
the unborn child had a soul. It is not known whether that argu-
ment has ceased, but if we assume this spiritual problem has
been settled, another has rushed in to take its place. This ques-
tion is somewhat more mundane and involves whether such
child has a body prior to its birth which the law of torts will
recognize as worthy of its concern.
This latter argument got under way in 1884 with the deci-
sion of Dietrich v. The Inhabitants of Northampton.' From this
acorn quite an oak has grown. But what is perhaps more sig-
nificant, this same seed seems to have produced a walnut and
perhaps a pine for it is believed that some of the decisions since
1884 have produced results quite unlike the original. In view of
the fact that early precedents have played quite a significant role
in this particular area, it should be helpful to look rather closely
at the earliest decisions and briefly trace their effect.
In the Dietrich case, the pregnant mother, or so it was alleged,
was caused to fall because of a defective condition of the street
of the defendant town which existed because of the latter's negli-
gence. The mother was between four and five months advanced
in pregnancy, and the fall brought on a miscarriage though the
unborn child received no traumatic injury. It is doubtful that
the child lived at all after birth though some signs of life were
noted for ten or fifteen minutes. 2 This action was by the admin-
istrator for the benefit of the mother to recover damages for the
death of the child. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote for the court. He
expressed some doubt as to wh~at extent the criminal law of
Massachusetts extended its protection to children en ventre sa
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
2. These signs of life might have been nothing more than muscular
twitchings caused by the change in temperature. 1 Beck, Medical Jurispru-
dence 411 (11 ed. 1860).
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mere, but he argued that if it gave its protection to the extent
urged by counsel for the plaintiff, such would not be controlling
in favor of the plaintiff in the case before the court. Mr. Justice
Holmes concluded:
"But no case, so far as we know, has ever decided that, if
the infant survived, it could maintain an action for injuries
received by it while in its mother's womb. . . . Taking all
the foregoing considerations into account, and further, that,
as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of
the injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to
be recovered for at all was recoverable by her." 3
It should be emphasized that here the child was not
viable4 and most likely did not experience any extrauterine life;
that it received no direct injury but only a communication of the
shock to the mother and that the injury was caused without any
specific chance for the alleged wrongdoer to be aware of the
presence of the unborn child.
The next case to be decided by a common law court was
that of Walker v. Great Northern Railway Company of Ireland.5
In that case plaintiff was injured while en ventre sa mere when
his mother, who was a passenger on defendant's trolley, suffered
a mishap alleged to be due to defendant's negligence. The plain-
tiff was denied recovery. All four of the judges participating
wrote opinions and concluded that no contractual relationship
with the plaintiff existed, there being a contract only with the
mother," made in ignorance of the existence of the plaintiff, and,
therefore, that no basis for plaintiff's recovery existed. This was
the real basis of decision. But two of the judges went further
and stated dicta to the effect that it was doubtful that one could
recover in tort under any circumstanc'es for injuries negligently
inflicted while en ventre sa mere. Justice Johnson typically
stated, "as a matter of fact when the act of negligence occurred
3. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15, 17 (1884).
4. This fact probably should be immaterial. See p. 391 et seq., infra. But
viability became quite an important factor in later decisions. Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit Corp., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334 (1949); Lipps v. Milwaukee
Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916, L.R.A. 1917B, 334 (1916).
5. 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891).
6. "The contract was between the defendants and Mrs. Walker, and, so
far as contract was concerned, it was to Mrs. Walker that the defendants
were liable for a breach of it." Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69,
87 (Q.B. 1891).
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the plaintiff was not in esse,-was not a person or a passenger or
a human being." "
These somewhat feeble authorities against recovery were
the only two authorities of any kind outstanding at the time the
first case with factual appeal came before a court of last resort.
In Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital8 plaintiff's mother, in anticipa-
tion of his birth, had entered the defendant hospital for pre-
delivery care. This purpose was specifically known to the defen-
dant. While a passenger in one of defendant's elevators, plain-
tiff's mother was seriously injured because of the alleged negli-
gence of the operator and upon plaintiff's birth four days later,
it was learned that he too had suffered severe traumatic damage
which developed into permanent injuries. Here the court had
before it a case where the child was clearly viable at the time of
injury; where there could be no question about the defendant
being aware of the existence of the plaintiff as a viable fetus and
where there seemed to be little question about the causal rela-
tionship between the defendant's conduct and the injuries which
plaintiff, then a living person, was continuing to suffer. Never-
theless the majority cited and relied heavily on the Dietrich and
Walker cases and adopted them as full, complete and adequate
authority for denying the. plaintiff's right to recover. The factual
differences between those cases and the case before the court
either did not occur to the majority or were regarded by it as
irrelevant. That the latter was the case is indicated by the fol-
lowing statement contained in the able dissenting opinion of
Justice Boggs:
"This case [Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton] can
have little application here, for the reason in the case at bar
it appears from the declaration the child had reached that
stage of foetal life when it was capable of continued exis-
tence independent of the mother; that its person was injured
within itself, and it was afterwards born alive and with
sufficient strength and maturity to maintain independent'
existence, and still lives. It does not follow from the Dietrich
Case the plaintiff in this cause should not be recognized as
capable of having a locus standi in court to recover damages
for injuries to his person, or that the Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts would have so held.
7. Id. at 84.
8. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
9. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 372, 56 N.E. 638, 642 (1900).
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That the majority was not impressed by these distinctions
is also indicated by this extract from its opinion:
"That a child before birth is, in fact, a part of the mother
and is only severed from her at birth, cannot, we think, be
successfully disputed. The doctrine of the civil law and'
the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, therefore, that an
unborn child may be regarded as in esse for some purposes,
when for its benefit, is a mere legal fiction, which, so far as
we have been able to discover, has not been indulged in by
the courts of common law to the extent of allowing an action
by an infant for injuries occasioned before its birth." 10
With this decision the rule denying recovery to viable as
well as nonviable infants at the time of injury; to those who
survived in an injured state as well as to those who were still-
born; and to those whose existence though in the womb was
clearly known to the actor as well as to those whose existence was
unknown seemed to become clearly established. There then fol-
lowed a long series of decisions denying recovery based upon
these authorities.
1 1
It was not until 1923 that any court in the United States
allowed an action based upon injuries prenatally sustained. In
that year a Louisiana intermediate court approved such a peti-
tion in Cooper v. Blanck.12 In that case the mother who was eight
months advanced in pregnancy was injured while lying in bed
when struck by falling plaster from the ceiling of her apartment
which was owned by the defendant. The child, which was born
prematurely, lived only three days and died from injuries alleged
to have been sustained from the falling plaster. The action was
brought by the father and mother under a Louisiana statute' 3
10. 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640.
11. See Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Rfy., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566
(1926); Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E. 2d 446 (1939); Bliss v.
Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E. 2d 206 (1951); Newman v. City of Detroit,
281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Rys. of St. Louis, 248 Mo.
126, 154 S.W. 71, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 625, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 613 (1913); Drabbels v.
Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951); Stemmer v. Kline, 128
N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567,
20 A.L.R. 1503 (1921); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28
(1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704, 55 L.R.A. 118, 91 Am. St.
Rep. 629 (1901); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78
S.W. 2d 944 (1935); Lewis v. Steve's Sash & Door Co., 177 S.W. 2d 350 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159
N.W. 916, L.R.A. 1917B, 334 (1916).
12. 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923).
13. Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870, which reads in part as follows:
"Every act whatever of a man that causes damage to another, obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it; the right of this action shall survive
In case of death in favor of the children, including adopted children . . . or
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which provides for recovery similar to that allowed by both
survival and wrongful death statutes of the type generally in
effect in most of our states. The court held that the plaintiff's
petition stated a cause of action. This case loses some of its force
as a common law precedent, however, since it was decided in a
civil law jurisdiction and under a provision of the local code.
Nevertheless much of the reasoning of the court would have
been applicable to an action maintained in any type of jurisdic-
tion.14 In Kine v. Zuckerman'5 a lower Pennsylvania court
allowed recovery though it was later impliedly overruled by a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision.
16
At this point, chronologically, an interesting case appears.
In Korman v. Hagen' the Supreme Court of Minnesota allowed
a child recovery for injuries sustained by malpractice in the
course of its delivery. Clearly the child had not been born at the
time the injuries were inflicted, but apparently the point did not
occur to either counsel or the court. It might very well be argued
that this case demonstrates what the natural instincts of justice
and the common sense of the situation produces when the court
is not distracted by decisions reached under less appealing cir-
cumstances. This case, despite its departure from precedent,
however, seems to have been overlooked by all courts and writers
on the subject.
In 1933 recovery was allowed in a case of this type in Mont-
real Tramways v. Leveille.'5 Again this case loses some of its
force as a common law precedent in view of the fact that it was
decided under the influence of the civil law. In 1939 California
allowed a petition based upon prenatal injuries in the case of
spouse of the deceased, or either of them, and in default of these in favor of
the surviving father and mother or either of them .... for the space of one
year from the death....
"The survivors above mentioned may also recover the damages sustained
by them by the death of the parent or child or husband or wife or brothers
or sisters or adoptive parent, or parents, or adopted person, as the case
may be."
14. "In Badie v. Columbia Brewing Co., 142 La. 853, 77 So. 768, our own
Supreme Court held that a right of action survived' to a child en ventre
sa mere and that it could recover after its birth for the loss of its father,
killed by the wrongful act of another. This decision has an important bear-
ing in the instant case for, as we see it, it presents the converse of the propo-
sition' we are discussing. If a child en ventre sa mere Is in contemplation of
law a separate entity, to the extent that a right of action survives to it for
injury to its father inflicted during its gestation, why does not the right of
action survive to the father for personal injuries to the child, inflicted prior
to parturition?" Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352, 360 (La. App. 1923).
15. 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
16. See Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940).
17. 165 Minn. 320, 206 N.W. 650 (1925).
18. Canada S.C. 456 (1933).
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Scott v. McPheeters.9 The case was decided under a statute
which provided: "A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be
deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its
interests in the event of its subsequent birth .... ,, 20 Differing
opinions might be entertained as to whether that statute did
more than enact the common law rule that one en ventre sa
mere will be considered as in esse, particularly in property mat-
ters, where it is for such one's benefit to be so regarded. It is
pretty clear, however, that the California court considered some-
thing had been added.2 1 But again, as in the Cooper case22
much of the language used would be applicable to a case of this
kind arising under the common law.23
In 1946 a federal district court approved a prenatal injury
petition in a case in which the common law was relied upon
solely.2 4 All of the reasons theretofore given for denying recov-
ery were examined and rejected. It was not until 1949, however,
that a decision of a court of last resort approved such a petition
based solely upon common law considerations. In that year the
Supreme Courts of both Ohio25 and Minnesota 26 allowed such
19. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939), rehearing denied, 33 Cal. App.
2d 629, 93 P. 2d 562 (1939).
20. Calif. Civ. Code, § 29 (Deering, 1949).
21. "The merits of the appeal rest entirely upon the construction of sec.
29 of the Civil Code .... " Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 630, 92 P.
2d 678, 679 (1939), rehearing denied 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 93 P. 2d 562 (1939).
22. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923).
23. "It is common knowledge that when a child's lungs and organs are
fully developed, even in a seven-months baby, it is frequently capable of
living and that it actually exists as a human being separate and distinct
from its mother, even though it is prematurely born by artificial means or
by, accident. Who may say that such a viable child is not in fact a human
being in actual existence? ...
"It would seem to us inhuman and an acknowledgment of inherent
weakness of the law to deny a remedy to one who is condemned to contend
with the struggles of life in a maimed and crippled condition due to the
wanton or negligent acts of another person. The difficulty of obtaining proof
of the wrong should prompt greater leniency in affording the remedy, rather
than a denial of plain justice. We are not impressed with the reasoning
that a clear remedy for an injustice should be denied because the wrong is
not readily susceptible of proof. Law is progressive and should lend its aid
to secure justice rather than to block it." 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 635, 92 P. 2d
678, 681-682 (1939).
24. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
25. See Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Corp., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.
2d 334 (1949). Ohio has the following constitutional provision which was
considered by the court: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without
denial or delay." Ohio Const. Art. I, § 16. But since the basic issue has
always been whether an unborn infant was a "person" within the eyes of
the law, it is believed that this provision did not essentially alter the com-
mon law issues.
26. See Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (1949).
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actions. The action in the Ohio case was by the infant who had
survived, while the action in the Minnesota case was purely one
under that state's wrongful death statute, the child having been
stillborn. This difference is considered by some to be material
on the ground that the policy considerations are much stronger
for allowing recovery to the living child whose mind or body
was impaired by a prenatal injury than for allowing recovery
to the next of kin under a wrongful death statute where the
infant was stillborn.2 7
As an aside, it is interesting to note that these cases were
decided within approximately six weeks of each other and that
the Minnesota court in deciding the Verkennes case, the second
decided, was wholly unaware of the Williams case in Ohio. This
perhaps lends some support to those who wish to explain all
things in terms of an inevitable concatenation of general but
multiple and complex factors.
These two decisions have not created a stampede in the direc-
tion of allowing such actions, but it is believed that they restored,
in part at least, a wholesome balance among the authorities which
will enable the courts to consider more freely cases hereafter on
their merits rather than under the pressure of a unanimous
weight of authority denying recovery. Consequently, two of
the three courts which have considered this problem for the first
time since 1949 have allowed such actions 28 and one has denied
it.29 And one court which had denied the action previously
allowed it on reconsideration, ° while Massachusetts, which began
the trend against recovery with its decision in the Dietrich case
3
'
adhered to that position upon reconsideration.3 2 That the ardor
of the Massachusetts court for its original position was weakened
27. See Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 20, 50 N.W. 2d 229, 232
(1951); Gamble, Tort Actions for Injuries to Unborn Infants, 3 Vand. L. Rev.
282, 295 (1950).
28. See Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d
909 (1951); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A. 2d 550 (Md. 1951).
29. See Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951). The
child in this case was stillborn and the court reserved its opinion on other
types of action in these words: "There are cases holding that a child born
alive may maintain an action for prenatal injuries. Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334, 10 A.L.R. 2d 1051; Jasin-
sky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E. 2d 809; Bonbrest v. Kotz, D.C. 65 F.
Supp. 138. This question, however, is not before us and we leave it for
determination if and when it arises." 155 Neb. 17, 20, 50 N.W. 2d 229, 232.
30. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951) overruling
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567, 20 A.L.R. 1503 (1921).
31. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. St. Rep.
242 (1884).
32. See Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E. 2d 206 (1951).
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somewhat is indicated by the following statement of the court
made after summarizing the reasons for allowing recovery:
"We readily concede the strength of these grounds, but
there is also strength in the arguments to the contrary, in-
cluding that based upon the practical difficulty of reliable
proof. We do not intimate what our decision would be if the
question were presented for the first time. The Dietrich
case not only established the law in this Commonwealth
since its rendition more than sixty years ago but it is still
supported by the great weight of authority in other juris-
dictions." 33
Thus the authorities stand. The numerical weight of author-
ity, particularly if we consider only courts of last resort, is still
substantially against allowing recovery. 4 But those who make
predictions in the law based on trends should take serious notice
of the strong one in favor of allowing recovery.
The foregoing is a somewhat sketchy recitation of the devel-
opment of the authorities. A better insight into the overall prob-
lem can be obtained by examining in detail the principal reasons
for denying recovery. If this approach appears to be placing the
burden of proof 35 upon those who deny recovery, that is where it
appears it should be. It seems that elementary justice requires
that recovery be allowed to the injured in mind or body who
come into court and establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that such impairment was caused by action of the defendant
which, had it been toward the born, would be the basis of recov-
ery. The principal reasons for denying recovery can be grouped
under four headings.
First, lack of precedent and stare decisis. These grounds
seemed to either weigh heavily or be the sole grounds of decision
in all cases denying recovery.3e But it seems that lack of prece-
33. 326 Mass. 461, 463, 95 N.E. 2d 206, 207.
34. Jurisdictions denying recovery are Alabama, Ireland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas and Wisconsin. See notes 3, 5, 9 and 11, supra. Those allowing recovery
are Federal District Court of District of Columbia, California, Canada,
Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New York and Ohio. See notes 12,
17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 27, and 29, supra. But we should be reminded that the
decisions in the District of Columbia and Louisiana have the sanction only
of lower courts, that the Canadian and Louisiana decisions were under the
influence of the civil law and that the Louisiana and California decisions
were under their respective codes. For a discussion of Louisiana law on
prenatal Injuries, see Note, 12 LOUISIANA LAW RsviEw 519 (1952).
35. The term "burden of proof" as used here has nothing to do with on
whom the burden lies in an individual lawsuit.
36. See cases in notes 3, 5, 9 and 11, supra.
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dent, in the sense of there being no favorably decided case on a
fact situation similar in substantial detail to that before the
court, is at most a half reason for denying an action. It is per-
haps much less than that when there is no decision anywhere to
the contrary and there are broad general principles of the com-
mon law which point to allowing such an action. It seems fair
to say that this was exactly the situation in which the Massa-
chusetts court found itself when it came to decide the Dietrich
case. True, there were no cases allowing recovery for injuries
sustained by an unborn child. But there was a broad common
law rule which allowed recovery to those who suffered bodily
injury because of the wrongful acts of another. This general
rule had then, as it does now, a number of qualifications, but
a rule denying recovery for injuries prenatally sustained was not
one of them.
On the contrary, there were markers pointing in the oppo-
site direction. The criminal law undoubtedly took some heed of
the existence of the unborn child37 as did the law of property
where it was to the infant's benefit to do so. 3 8 The fact that this
latter policy was borrowed from the civil law39 should have no
bearing. The common law does not have its own private legal
well; and whether it has drawn from the Law of Moses, the
Code of Hammurabi or the Civil Law, it is the policy of the
common law if it is applied by its courts.
And at the time the Dietrich case was decided there was ele-
mentary learning which would have supported recovery if the
court had elected to so hold. Blackstone, who was no doubt the
greatest authority on the common law in his day, said: "Life is
the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an
infant is able to stir in the mother's womb." 40 And the unborn
child has been known to stir in its mother's womb as early as
ten weeks following conception, and such activity generally
37. See p. 396 et seq., infra.
38. See p. 397 et seq., infra.
39. "The doctrine of the civil law and the ecclesiastical and admiralty
courts, therefore, that an unborn child may be regarded as in ease for some
purposes, when for its benefit, is a mere legal fiction, which, so far as we
have been able to discover, has not been indulged in by the courts of common
law to the extent of allowing an action by an infant for injuries occasioned
before its birth." Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638,
640 (1900).
40. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries, 130 (4 ed., Cooley, 1899).
1952]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
begins by the sixteenth week of intrauterine life.41 Though a
live fetus which moves 'independently of any thought processes
or motor responses of the mother may not completely meet our
popular notions of a person in being, it is many civilized
thoughts beyond either an outlaw or a nonentity.
So it seems that the claim that there was no precedent in the
broad sense of the term for allowing recovery at the time the
Dietrich case was decided rested "upon a slender reed" if I may
be so ungracious as to borrow one of Mr. Justice Holmes' own
phrases.42 That lack of precedent in the narrow sense in which
it did not exist should not alone have barred recovery, is indi-
cated by the whole history of the growth of the common law.
The court in Bonbrest v. Kotz43 stated:
"The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to
those who by their wrongful act, if such be proved, have
invaded the right of an individUal-employed as the defen-
dants were in this case to attend, in their professional capaci-
ties, both the mother and child .... The Common law is not
an arid and sterile thing, and is anything but static and
inert." 44
A similar thought was more fully stated in Russick v. Hicks45:
"The novelty of an asserted right and the lack of
common-law precedent therefor are not valid reasons for
denying its existence. The genius of the common law is
its flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation. It
has always been recognized that the common law is not a
rigid, inflexible, static thing, but is a living organism, ever
growing and expanding to meet the problems and needs of
changing social and economic conditions. The common law
is not a primer of rigid and absolute rules, but rather a body
of broad and comprehensive principles created by judicial
decisions and based on justice, reason, and common sense.
Its principles have been determined by the needs of society
and are ever susceptible to adaptation to new conditions,
relations, and usages, as the progress of civilization may
require." 46
41. 1 Beck, Medical Jurisprudence, 277 (11 ed. 1860).
42. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
43. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. D.C. 1946).
44. Id. at 142.
45. 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
46. Id. at 285-286.
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Even if we add to the lack of supporting specific precedent
the existence of opposing specific precedent, we do not have an
insuperable barrier, especially in the field of torts, to the reach-
ing of a particular result. In the case of Woods v., Lancet47 the
New York Court of Appeals was faced with a weight of authority
opposing a recovery in cases of this type including one of its own
decisions. 48 The court nonetheless allowed the action and had
this to say concerning lack of precedent and stare decisis:
"Following Drobner v. Peters, supra, would call for an
affirmance but the chief basis for that holding (lack of prece-
dent) no longer exists. And it is not a very strong reason,
anyhow, in a case like this. Of course, rules of law on which
men rely in their business dealings should not be changed
in the middle of the game, but what has that to do with
bringing to justice a tort-feasor who surely has no moral or
other right to rely on a decision of the New York Court of
Appeals? Negligence law is common law, and the common
law has been molded and changed and brought up-to-date in
many another case....
"The sum of the argument against plaintiff here is that
there is no New York decision in which such a claim has
been enforced .... We act in the finest common-law tradition
when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-
sense justice.
"The same answer goes to the argument that the change
we here propose should come from the Legislature, not the
courts. Legislative action there could, of course, be, but we
abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory,
when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory
court-made rule." 9
If the analysis of the condition concerning precedent at the
time the Dietrich case was decided is correct, such precedent as
there was then for recovery exists today augmented by the cases
allowing recovery decided in recent years. And if, by the same
token, the opposing body of case law has been built, in part at
least, upon a first case of equivocal precedential value, any court
wherein such a case is one of first impression, should have no
reluctance to freely consider it in the light of advanced scien-
47. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951).
48. See Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567, 20 A.L.R. 1503 (1921).
49. 303 N.Y. 349, 353, 102 N.E. 2d 691, 694 (1951).
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tific knowledge and a good, common, garden variety sense of
justice. Even where there is a precedent adverse to recovery in
the particular jurisdiction, there would seem to be justification
for a re-examination of the whole question.
A second reason given by most courts50 for denying recovery
in cases of the type here under consideration is that the child is
a part of the mother until birth and therefore is not a person in
being.51. Of course, the whole problem here is in determining
what is meant by "in being." Each man here can win his argu-
ment if he is permitted to define his terms. So perhaps we should
eschew definitions and turn to those who have recorded some
facts for us at a time when they were not concerned with a con-
troversy over the right of one to recover for injuries prenatally
sustained. We are told that by the eighth week following con-
ception, the embryo or fetus52 is "an unmistakable human being,
even though it is only three-fourths of an inch long";53 that it
has been known to stir noticeably as early as the tenth week
and movements are generally noticed as early as the sixteenth;54
that an unmistakable case is on record where a five and one-half
month fetus was born and lived to maturity;5 5 that "The foetus
is certainly, if we speak physiologically, as much a living being
immediately after conception, as it is at any other time before
delivery"56 and that normal infants have been taken from dead
mothers to live without difficulty.57 Chief Justice Brogan, dis-
50. See Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566
(1926); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638, 48 L.R.A. 225
(1900); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242
(1884); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951); Drobner
v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567, 20 A.L.R. 1503 (1921); Berlin v. J. C.
Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169,
49 Atl. 704, 55 L.R.A. 118, 91 Am. St. Rep. 629 (1901); Magnolia Coca Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944 (1935); Lipps v. Milwaukee
Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916, L.R.A. 1917B, 34 (1916)
(but restricted to nonviable foetus).
51. Of the cases that have discussed this question none has been called
upon to make at precise statement on when birth is accomplished. But one
gathers the impression from reading the cases that birth is not fully accom-
plished until the umbilical cord is severed.
.52. "In mammals and other viviparous vertebrates embryo is applied only
to early stages passed within the mother's body; later (in human embryology,
usually after the third month of development) the young is called a fetus."
Webster's New International Dictionary (2 ed. 1934).
53. Corner, Ourselves Unborn 69 (1944).
54. 1 Beck, Medical Jurisprudence 277 (11 ed. 1860).
55. Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence 683 (1931).
56. 1 Beck, Medical Jurisprudence 276 (11 ed. 1860).
57. De Lee, Principles and Practice of Obstetrics 949-950 (9 ed., Green-
hill, 1947). If the unborn child physiologically is a part of the mother, as is
argued by courts denying recovery, I suppose we would have to call that feat
a resurrection rather than a birth.
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senting in Stemmer v. Kline,5  summarized the physiological
facts thusly:
"While it is a fact that there is a close dependence by
the unborn child on the organism of the mother, it is not
disputed today that the mother and the child are two sep-
arate and distinct entities; that the unborn child has its own
system of circulation of the blood separate and apart from
the mother; that there is no communication between the two
circulation systems; that the heart beat of the child is not
in tune with that of the mother but is more rapid; that there
is no dependence by the child on the mother except for
sustenance." 59
All of us fathers can join with Chief Justice Brogan in his fur-
ther comment that dependency for sustenance does not end with
birth. In fact most of us are tattered proof of the fact that a new
dependency begins at birth-a dependency for clothes.
So the principal thing wrong with the argument that an
unborn child is not in being is that it simply does not accord
with physical fact.60 Lawyers and judges kid no one but them-
selves when they continue to say so. I should not envy the one
who had to explain to a plumber's convention that an unborn
child was not in being, or, worse still, to a chapter of the Junior
League. Perhaps least of all would I envy the one who sought
to make that explanation ring true to the child with an impaired
body acquired through prenatal injuries wrongfully inflicted
by another. If that be said to be sentimental dramatization of
the argument, it can be replied that some courts have similarly
dramatized their reasons for denying recovery by raising a
spectre of torrents of fictitious litigation which, it is believed, it
is unrealistic to fear.6 1
Except for the bearing it might have on the question of duty
presently to be discussed,6 2 it seems that the whole argument on
whether the unborn child is a person in being is rather pointless.
The incontrovertible fact confronts us that the processes of nature
have been irrevocably set in motion which, if no mishap occurs,
will ultimately produce a child whom all will concede to be in
58. 128 N.J.L. 455, 463, 26 A. 2d 489, 685 (1942).
59. 128 N.J.L. 455, 466, 26 A. 2d 489, 687.
60. If what the courts are talking about is legal fact, that, of course, puts
us right back on the merry-go-round by assuming the question In Issue.
61. See p. 402 et seq., infra.
62. See p. 400 et seq., infra.
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esse; and that from the time of conception until birth, it is subject,
whether or not a person in being, to having the course of its life
permanently affected by the physical treatment it receives. Rec-
ognizing such as fact, why should one flounder about in the
argument as to whether such "thing" is .or is not a person in
being?
A discussion of this issue should not be closed without taking
note of the fact that the unborn child is recognized by other
branches of the common law as well as by statute. Blackstone
said:
"For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or
otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if anyone beat her,
whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered
of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the ancient
law homicide or manslaughter. But the modem law does
not look upon this offense in quite so atrocious a light, but
merely as a heinous misdemeanor." 63
It has been held to be murder if a child is born alive but later
dies from injuries feloniously inflicted before birth,6 4 and abor-
tion is made a. crime by statute in practically all jurisdictions.6 5
In the field of property law we find that the infant en ventre sa
mere is capable of taking a legacy or as a grantee or cestui que
trust, may have a guardian appointed for it and have an estate
limited to its use,66 and in tort law we find that such infant may
bring an action for the wrongful death of its father occurring
before its birth.6 7
Substantially all of the courts denying recovery for injuries
prenatally sustained have felt the necessity of explaining away
this rather imposing array of evidence that the child at birth did
not break forth into a legal world wholly oblivious to its prior
existence. A concise effort in this respect was made by the Wis-
consin court in these words:
"The fact that the criminal law protects nonviable infants
does not affect the question of their civil rights. The criminal
law rests upon grounds of public policy and affects the
63. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 129 (4 ed., Cooley, 1899).
64. Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).
65. See 1 C.J.S. Abortion, § 2 (1936).
66. See Barnett v. Pinkston, 238 Ala. 327, 191 So. 371 (1939); Medlock v.
Brown, 163 Ga. 520, 136 S.E.' 551 (1927); 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 130 (4
ed., Cooley, 1899).
67. See Bonnarens v. Lead Belt Ry., 309 Mo. 65, 273 S.W. 1043 (1925);
Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S.W. 1021 (1890).
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public; the law of torts relates solely to the rights of private
parties. So, too, the fact that for purposes of inheritance,
taking under a will, etc., the existence of unborn children is
recognized in law has no particular bearing upon the ques-
tion of their right to recover for injuries sustained before
birth. Neither does the medical or scientific recognition of
the separate entity of an unborn child aid in determining its
legal rights. The law cannot always be scientific or tech-
nically correct. It must often content itself with being merely
practical." 68
To the court's comments on the difference between the func-
tions of the criminal and civil law, the response might be: What
does it prove on the issues involved in actions for prenatal injur-
ies? The comments on an unborn infant's property rights moves
one to yet ask, why not? And the comments on being practical
suggest the inquiry, practical as to whom? It would doubtless be
quite practical to the injured child and its parents to be compen-
sated for provable losses sustained at the hands of a wrongdoer.
The Texas court in the Magnolia case6 9 took up one by one
these recognitions of infants en ventre sa mere by other branches
of the law and sought to distinguish them. Feeling that it should
confine itself to a consideration of Texas criminal law, it quoted
two articles of the Texas Penal Code70 apparently to prove that
Texas criminal law did not concern itself with infants until born
or in the process of being born. But the court failed to discuss
Article 1191 of the same penal code which reads in part:
"If any person shall designedly administer to a preg-
nant woman . . . , or shall use towards her any violence or
means whatever, externally or internally applied, and there-
by procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the peniten-
tiary not less than two nor more than five years .... By
'abortion' is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall
68. Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 276, 159
N.W. 916, 917 (1916).
69. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d
944, 97 A.L.R. 1513 (1935).
70. The two articles quoted are Art. 1205, Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1925),
which reads: "The person upon whom the homicide is alleged to have been
committed must be in existence by actual birth. It is homicide, however, to
destroy human life actually in existence however frail such existence may be
or however near extinction from other causes." and Art. 1195, Tex. Pen. Code
(Vernon, 1925), which reads: "Whoever shall during parturition of the
mother destroy the vitality or life in a child in a state of being born and
before actual birth, which child would otherwise have been born alive, shall
be confined in the penitentiary for life or for not less than five years."
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be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth
thereof be caused." (Italics supplied.) 7 1
It should be noted that the statute uses, and it is assumed ad-
visedly, both the terms "embryo" and "fetus" and speaks of the
"life" of each. So it may be concluded that the statute intended
to cover the entire gestation period.72 While it is true, as the
court concludes, that it is not homicide in Texas to destroy the
life of an infant en ventre sa mere,78 it does not seem to follow
that Texas criminal law does not concern itself about such infants
from the time. of conception.
The analogy of property rights was briefly disposed of; 74 but
a feature of this decision unique among all those denying recovery
is its efforts to distinguish an earlier Texas case 75 which allowed
a child unborn76 'at the time of his father's wrongfully caused
death to recover after birth as a "surviving" child under the
Texas wrongful death statute.77 The court in so deciding had
very clearly said that the unborn infant was in being. 78 The
court in the Magnolia case,79 however, seemed to, think that the
decision afforded "little, if any, argument in favor of recovery
in the instant case. The child when it is born and lives is in fact
a surviving child and comes within the express language of the
statute." 80 To which it might be replied that if an injured unborn
71. Tex. Pen. Code Art. 1191 (Vernon, 1925).
72. See note 52, supra.
73. "This state, therefore, has not brought unborn children within the
protection of its penal statutes defining and prescribing penalties for homi-
cide." Magnolia Coca ColN Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 357, 78 S.W.
2d 944, 948 (1935).
74. "The decisions which protect unborn children in property and prop-
erty rights but undertake by the indulgence of a fiction of existence to save
to the child property which in fairness belongs to it. They do not support
the imposition of liability upon others for torts indirectly committed against
a prospective human being, one unseen and unknown, and who may never
have an independent existence. As said by Justice Pound, in Drobner v.
Peters, supra: 'Rights of ownership of property do not connote a duty of
personal care to the inchoate owner.'" 124 Tex. 347, 357, 78 S.W. 2d 944, 948
(1935).
75. Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S.W. 1021 (1890).
76. In fact the mother was advanced only some three months in preg-
nancy. 78 Tex. 621, 622, 14 S.W. 1021.
77. "Action for damage arising from death shall be for the, sole and
exclusive benefit of and may be brought by the surviving husband, wife,
children, and parents of the persons whose death has been caused by or
either of them for the benefit of all." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 4675 (Vernon,
1925).
78. "We think, also, that the plaintiff in this case, although unborn at the
time of his father's death, was in being, and one of his surviving children."
78 Tex. 621, 626, 14 S.W. 1021, 1023.
79. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d
944, 97 A.L.R. 1513 (1935).
80. 124 Tex. 347, 357, 78 S.W. 2d 944, 948.
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child is later born and lives, it is a "person" within the meaning
of other operative portions of the Texas wrongful death statute.,,
I
Thus it would seem that the courts denying recovery for pre-
natal injuries have not effectively escaped the implications for
tort law of the recognition by the criminal law and other field's
of the civil law of the infant's prenatal existence.
And the courts allowing actions for prenatal injuries have
been unable to escape such implications. A number of strong
statements appear in such cases, that from the Georgia court in
a recent case8 2 being typical. It commented concerning the prop-
erty law analogy:
"It cannot seriously be denied that the purpose of the
common law in allowing the appointment of a guardian for
the unborn child is to make available processes of the law
for the protection and preservation of the properties belong-
ing to the child. There is nothing in the common law to
indicate that it would withhold from such a child its processes
for the purpose of protecting and preserving the person as
well as the property of such child. It would therefore seem
to us to be an unwarranted reflection upon the common law
itself to attribute to it a greater concern for the protection
of property than for the protection of the person. Whether
the recognition of the right of property in the unborn child
is founded upon the welfare of the child or of society, each
of these is more vitally concerned about the physical impair-
ments of the child itself than about its property. It would
therefore be illogical, unrealistic, and unjust-both to the
child and to society-for the law to withhold its processes
necessary for the protection of the person of an unborn child,
while, at the same time, making such processes available for
the purpose of protecting its property." 83
With respect to the criminal law analogy it commented:.
"This court will not overlook, however, the provisions of
the criminal law of this State, Chapter 26-11 of the Georgia
Code of 1933, providing punishment for those inflicting
injury upon an unborn child. Code, § 26-1103 provides that,
81. Each of the pertinent parts of the article of the Texas wrongful death
statute which confers the cause of action begins "When an injury causing
the death of any person .. " Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 4671 (Vernon, 1925).
82. Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d 909
(1951).
83. 65 S.E. 2d 909, 910.
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if under circumstances therein described an injury to the
mother and her unborn child would, if the mother dies, con-
stitute murder, then, for the wilful killing of the unborn
child, the punishment shall be death or life imprisonment
for the person committing the crime. The purpose of crim-
inal law is to protect both the individual and society from
criminal conduct. If the killing of the unborn child is
regarded by the law as being sufficient injury to society to
justify taking the life of the perpetrator of the crime, then,
to be logical and just to the injured child, the law must
•allow it to employ legal process and recover damages for
the injury inflicted upon it. It would be contrary to every
principle of right and justice, which are the very essence of
law, to deny such rights to the injured child." 84
Thus it seems that the evidence from medical men and other
branches of the law compels the conclusion that the infant en
ventre sa mere is a being in fact.
It is not clear from reading the cases allowing recovery to
unborn children for the wrongful death of their father occurring
before birth8 5 whether the cause of action vested in such child
subject to being defeated if it was born alive or whether a
potential cause of action in its favor was suspended until birth
and vested only at that time. If the former, it is a clear recogni-
tion that the child is in being before birth; if the latter, it is an
example of a lag between the conduct of the wrongdoer and the
maturing of the cause of action. Either theory will suffice to
overcome a problem in connection with actions for prenatal
injuries.
A third reason, and one closely allied to the second, for deny-
ing recovery is that no duty to exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances for its safety is owed to the unborn child.
8 6
That statement simply has a hollow ring. So to understand
better what the courts have in mind when they make this obser-
84. 65 S.E. 2d 909, 912.
85. Bonnarens v. Lead Belt Ry., 309 Mo. 65, 273 S.W. 1043 (1925); Nelson
v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S.W. 1021 (1890).
86. Some of the cases relying on the absence of duty as a basis for deny-
ing recovery are: Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108
So. 566 (1926); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900);
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. St. Rep. 242
(1884); Bliss v. Passanest, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E. 2d 206 (1951); Drobner v.
Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567, 20 A.L.R. 1503 (1921); Gorman v. Budlong,
23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704, 55 L.R.A. 118, 91 Am. St. Rep. 629 (1901); Magnolia Coca
Cola Bottling Company v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944 (1935).
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vation, let us examine briefly the function of duty in the law of
torts. It is safe to say that the concept of duty is primarily an
adjunct of the law of negligence. The law is not now, nor has it
ever been, seriously concerned about limiting the liability of the
intentional wrongdoer. But when the law of negligence came
along, the courts, feeling that it did not represent conduct terribly
anti-social, began to cast about for means of limiting the conse-
quences of the negligent actor's conduct. The concept of duty
is one of the results.81 Mr. Prosser defines it "as an obligation, to
which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a
particular standard of conduct toward another." 88 But Mr. Pros-
ser himself is the first to recognize this definition is of little value
in solving duty-problem cases.8 9 In fact, considerations of duty
are never the substantive reasons for a decision, but only the
legal sounding explanation for it. Faced with a new negli-
gence problem, the courts, based upon a multiplicity of consid-'
erations, many of which are subtle and complex, arrive at what
they conclude to be the proper result. Since all those considera-
tions would not sound judicial and since some of them may even
be inarticulate, a shorthand statement is needed to express the
result and such terms as duty and proximate cause have been
pressed into service. Such unquestionably is the case where
recovery has been denied for injuries prenatally sustained. That
such is true concerning the function of duty is indicated by
what I feel certain the courts, including those which deny recov-
ery in prenatal injury cases, would do with the following situa-
tion. Suppose the manufacturer of a Buick automobile was negli-
gent in the construction of one of the wheels on which it was to
roll. This negligent conduct occurred, and the car was sold to
a dealer, three months before P was conceived. P is later con-
ceived and shortly after his birth, the defective Buick is bought
by his father. On a cheery Sunday afternoon the family goes for
a ride, the wheel collapses and P is injured. Would the manu-
facturer escape liability because at the time he engaged in his
negligent conduct, P was nowhere around for people to owe a
87. See Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 178-179 (1941).
88. Id. at 178.
89. "Its artificial character is readily apparent; in the ordinary case, if
the court should desire to find liability, it would be quite as easy to find the
necessary 'relation' in the position of the parties toward one another, and
hence to extend the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. The statement that
there is or is not a duty begs the essential question-whether the plaintiff's
interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct."
Id. at 180.
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duty to? Or, if he recovers, is he the beneficiary of the duty
owed by the manufacturer to persons in being at the time he
acted?"O It is realized that the explanation here would be that
the manufacturer's negligence was a continuing one and was thus
operating at the time of P's injury when he was a proper subject
of duty. But that is a fiction pure and simple. The manufacturer
acted only once and that action was in fact wholly completed
before P was ever conceived. At any rate, if courts allowed recov-
ery to P, and it is believed that all would, it demonstrates how
courts turn duty on by fiction to allow recovery when it is so
desired and turn it off by fiction, as in the prenatal cases, to defeat
recovery when other considerations dictate such result.
So if the unborn child is, physiologically speaking, a person
in being and is so recognized in many branches of the law; and
if the courts can, at least in cases of first impression, find or
not find duty as required by the results they feel should be
reached; and if the lack of precedent or even the rule of stare
decisis is not an insurmountable difficulty to allowing recovery,
why have courts, in what appeared to be some meritorious cases,
denied to the plaintiff a cause of action?9 1 The courts were on
the whole strong courts and the judges able ones. Something
made them reluctant to allow recovery, and it is believed that
the real and only reason is the one sometimes expressed, but
most often not, that if the court grants recovery in such cases,
it will turn loose upon itself a torrent of litigation of a nature
with which it will be unable to cope. 2 This is the fourth reason
given by courts for denying recovery and was expressed by the
Texas court in these words:
"Good reason is found for denial of the right of recovery
in the fact that in many cases it would be impossible to estab-
lish except by speculation or conjecture that the death or
90. Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
91. The case of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638
(1900) presented a case where all of the factors warranting recovery seemed
to be of an establishable nature. See p. 385, supra. And in both Stemmer v.
Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942) and Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App.
100, 19 N.E. 2d 446 (1939), the mother's physician negligently diagnosed her
condition as tumor and gave her x-ray treatments designed to kill a tumor
until within some two months of time for delivery. Each of the children when
born had the conditions of destroyed bone and tissue which would likely
result from such treatment.
92. Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566
(1926); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d
944 (1935); and Walker v. Great Northern Railway Co., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1891)
are the only cases expressing in a substantial way this reason for denying
recovery.
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condition of the child was proximately caused by the injury.
But, far worse than the indulgence of such speculation and
conjecture and the insurmountable difficulty of satisfactorily
proving viability, there would follow in the wake of this
character of litigation many fictitious claims, with false
testimony in their support, which the defendant would al-
ways find difficult and often impossible to refute. These con-
siderations, we think, outweigh the denial of justice in the
abstract to the meritorious case." 11
This reason undoubtedly has some merit or at least did have at
one time. But it is believed that experience in the earliest juris-
dictions allowing such actions demonstrates that there is no real
cause for alarm in doing so. Louisiana allowed recovery as early
as 1923, 94 Canada as early as 1933,) 5 California in 1939,96 the Dis-
trict of Columbia in 1946, 9T and there is no indication that these
courts opened a Pandora's Box. In fact, no other cases have
reached the appellate courts in those jurisdictions.
It is believed that if the courts will quit shadow boxing with
unreal reasons for denying recovery and concentrate on such'
problems of proof as exist, they will be able to cope with them
as well as they do similar difficulties in cases involving sacroiliac
strains,, ruptured discs, cancer by trauma and injuries caused by
fright. W. T. Gamble in a recent law review article9 8 listed the
principal types of prenatal injuries that might be used as a basis
of a lawsuit and analyzed the nature of the proof presently avail-
able in each type of injury. His general conclusion was that
there was no sound basis for denying the right of action in such
cases because of difficulties of proof. The New York Court of
Appeals reached the same conclusion in the case of Woods v.
Lancet,9 where it said:
"Two other reasons for dismissal (besides lack of prece-
dent) are given in Drobner v. Peters, supra. The first of those,
discussed in many of the other writings on the subject herein
cited, has to do with the supposed difficulty of proving or
93. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.
2d 944, 950 (1935).
94. See Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923).
95. See Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, Canada S.C. 456 (1933).
96. See Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939).
97. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. D.C. 1946).
98. See Gamble, Tort Actions for Injuries to Unborn Infants, 3 Vand. L.
Rev. 282, 289 et seq. (1950).
99. 303 N.Y 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951).
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disproving that certain injuries befell the unborn child, or
that they produced the defects discovered at birth, or later.
Such difficulties there are, of course, and, indeed, it seems
to be commonly accepted that only a blow of tremendous
force will ordinarily injure a foetus, so carefully does nature
insulate it. But such difficulty of proof or finding is not spe-
cial to this particular kind of lawsuit (and it is beside the
point, anyhow, in determining sufficiency of a pleading).
Every day in all our trial courts (and before administrative
tribunals, particularly the Workmen's Compensation Board),
such issues are disposed of, and it is an inadmissible concept
that uncertainty of proof can ever destroy a legal right. The
questions of causation, reasonable certainty, etc., which will
arise in these cases are no different, in kind, from the ones
which have arisen in thousands of other negligence cases
decided in this state, in.the past." 100
This ground for denying the right to bring actions for pre-
natal injuries seems to be invalid for another reason. When
courts have denied the right to bring actions because of the fear
of a "flood of litigation," they have usually talked as though they
could not open the gates a little way; but that, if opened at all,
they must throw them completely ajar, and that, if they did so
and the "flood" came, there were never thereafter any curbing
measures, judicial or legislative, that could be brought to their
rescue. Such a view, it is believed, is unjustified.
In the first place, there is nothing which compels any court
to accept any principle in full and with all its implications. One
of the oldest judicial techniques is to proceed cautiously in a new
area, pricking out the law case by case. In this manner experi-
ence becomes the guide to the court, telling it how far to go. This
appears to be what the New York court has done in the Woods
case.'"' There appears to be no valid reason why other courts
may not similarly feel their way along.
In the second place, if a court should, in allowing an; other-
wise valid new application of recognized principles, let loose a
torrent of fictitious litigation supported by conjectural and
speculative evidence, there are a number of corrective measures
100. 102 N.E. 2d 691, 695.
101. "It is to be remembered that we are passing on the sufficiency of a
complaint which alleges that this injury occurred during the ninth month of
the mother's pregnancy, in other words, to a viable foetus, later born. There-
fore, we confine our holding in this case to prepartum injuries to such viable
children." 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691, 695.
[VOL. XII
PRENATAL INJURIES
available. One would be for the court to overrule its former
decision. This would occur so rarely it is not believed it would
introduce fickleness into the law. The court would then at least
be acting on fact and not on surmise as when it denies the action
without experience with it. But it probably would never be
necessary for a court to overrule its former decision. Trial courts,
if sustained by appellate courts, have devices which normally
would be effective in keeping litigation from running disastrously
to the spurious. The Texas court in the Magnolia case 1 2 said,
"Good reason is found for denial of the right of recovery in the
fact that in many cases it would be impossible to establish except
by speculation or conjecture that the death or condition of the
child was proximately caused by the injury." 103 The answer to
that problem is not to submit such a case to a jury. No court is
required to say that reasonable minds can find the plaintiff has
established his case by a preponderance of the evidence if any
essential part of it is supported only by conjecture and specula-
tion. Courts have been known to be reasonably conservative in
this respect,0 4 and it would seem to be better for courts to allow
meritorious actions and resort to conservatism in evaluating the
evidence to determine whether there is an issue for the jury
than to resort to blanket denials of the good and the bad.
And finally, if courts get themselves into a bad situation
from which they cannot extricate themselves by the means at
their disposal, a situation which will be rare indeed, there is no
reason why the legislature could not be called upon for corrective
measures. There would be nothing undignified in the courts
doing so. We are all familiar with the fact that the legislatures
of several states intervened to eliminate heart balm actions when
they felt abuses indicated such course to be necessary.'0 5 Our
guest statutes provide an example of corrective action instead
102. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d
944 (1935).
103. 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W. 2d 944, 950 (1935).
104. Berryhill v. Nichols, 171 Miss. 769, 158 So. 470 (1935).
105. The following language of the court in Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y.
349, 360, 102 N.E. 2d 691, 694 (1951), explains why it is not appropriate that
common law courts wait for the, legislature to direct them to apply existing
common law principles to allow recovery in prenatal injury cases. The court
said, "We act in the finest common-law tradition when we adapt and alter
decisional law to produce commonsense justice.
"The same answer goes to the argument that the change we here pro-
pose should come from the Legislature, not the courts. Legislative action
there could, of course, be, but we abdicate our own function, in a field peculi-
arly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory
court-made rule."
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of eliminating the cause of action altogether. That does not
exhaust the illustrations. Why there should be so much fear
when there are so many weapons at hand is difficult to under-
stand.
It is a reproach to the law for a court to ignore the realism
of the case before it because of a fear of results which can be
otherwise appropriately avoided. In the course of our legal his-
tory we have had considerable law by judicial fear. We still have
a great deal. It is doubtful that any of it is,. or ever was, justified.
It is hoped it will cease to be a reason for denying otherwise
meritorious actions.
CONCLUSION
The study devoted to the problem of this paper leads me to
conclude: (1) that there should be no blanket denial of tort
actions for injuries prenatally sustained; (2) that there are broad
common law principles which can be properly applied by the
courts to allow recovery; (3) that none of the reasons for deny-
ing such actions has substantial merit; and (4) that viability
should not be made an absolute criterion for allowing such actions'
because (a) it has no overpowering reasons to support it and
the time of viability is difficult to ascertain in many cases,1'6
(b) there are some types of serious injuries which are much more
likely to be inflicted,10 7 or to the causes of which the child is
much more likely to be wrongfully exposed before viability than
afterwards;"' and (c) to so use viability will raise another
artificial standard to haunt us and to interfere with the realistic
consideration of cases as does now the oft applied standard of
requiring the severance of the umbilical cord.
106. See Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352, 354, 355 (La. App. 1923).
107. "Animal experiment and human experience have both revealed an
incidence of malformations of the central nervous system, eyes and limbs in
the offspring of irradiated pregnant mothers. Injury is most likely to occur
if irradiation is applied during early pregnancy, particularly before the third
month." Dunlap and Smith, X-Rays and Radioactive Substances, 11 Mo. L.
Rev. 137, 187 (1946).
108. Studies have revealed that 87 per cent of mothers who had German
measles within the first three months of pregnancy gave birth to abnormal
babies. Abel and Van Dellen, The Effect of German Measles During Preg-
nancy, 32 J. Lab. and Clin. Med. 1536 (1947). Actionable conduct might arise
from a negligent exposure of the mother, to such disease; by a failure to
advise vaccination against it, or to advise a legal abortion after the mother
had had the disease.
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